objectivity, notably Harding's but also Michael Polanyi's (1962) 'The Republic of Science'. Polanyi argues that freedom of exchanging ideas and judgments in scientific communities is akin to general liberties in a democratic community and more vital than freedom of exchanging goods in economic communities.
The rhetorical environment that promotes disclosure resembles how conversations generally function in the global North, especially North America and Europe, but is otherwise somewhat unique to scientific communities and other institutions that emulate scientific objectivity. The culture of disclosure contrasts with at least some of the other cultures in which people operate, where silence has a wider range of meanings. The restricted significance that cultures of disclosure accord to silence indicates limits to the cognitive value of objectivity which is further compounded by the ways in which powerful people and communities, that include scientists and science, can benefit and may be benefiting from the ways silence operates as a form of oppression.
Although the significance of silence is itself rarely clear, attention to the rhetorical functions of silence throws into relief the value of objectivity. The uniqueness of the scientific culture of disclosure indicates limits to the objectivity it makes possible, and to any institution that seeks objectivity. These limitations depend on formal and informal standards of what is relevant to a particular empirical discourse that distinguish what scientists and their subjects must disclose from those about which they should be silent. Silence thus signifies an evaluation of some piece of communication -a hypothesis, finding or interpretation -as irrelevant. However, what counts as relevant and what could constitute a view that can achieve aperspectival objectivity can only be meanings that are disclosed through explicit communication. This system of building understanding ignores other meanings that silence can have, including the ways that silence is complicit in oppression. The operation of other meanings of silence, including subjugating forms, go unrecognized behind cultural protocols that attribute value only to perspectives that are disclosed. Some of the other meanings that silence can have include dissent, which supports the critical discourse that provides contextual and other democratic forms of objectivity. So, the scientific and quasi-scientific protocols intended to foster objectivity can, ironically, stifle sources for the diversity of perspectives and objectivity itself.
DISCLOSURE SERVES OBJECTIVITY
The objectivity of a belief depends, in Longino's account, on its production by critical discourse. The publicity of information and informed dissent makes epistemic progress possible; and it depends on there being a culture that values disclosure.
On any topic, whether scientific or less empirical, the availability of conflicting perspectives is necessary for objectivity as understood by Longino (1990: 75 -6) . She explains how objectivity accrues through scientific discourse:
Publication in a journal does not make an idea or result a brick in the edifice of knowledge. Its absorption is a much more complex process, involving such things as subsequent citation, use and modification by others, et cetera. Experimental data and hypotheses are transformed through the conflict and integration of a variety of points of view into what is ultimately accepted as scientific knowledge. (Longino 1990: 69) Therefore, 'the greater the number of different points of view included in a given community, the more likely it is that its scientific practice will be objective ' (1990: 80) . The beliefs resulting from scientific practice and the individual people engaged in the practice gain objectivity only insofar as that practice engages with criticism. Objectivity becomes possible through participation in an appropriately structured community, and particular beliefs and people have objectivity to the extent that they arise from or engage in such a community. 1 Longino admits that the criticism that supposedly makes objectivity possible does not obtain for some forms of understanding, including the mystical or emotional, which lack the necessary logical publicity. The medium of a common language and the purported existence of objects independent of individual subjective experience provide the shared environment. The common language and ontology make criticism salient, permitting understanding that transcends individual subjectivity (Longino 1990: 70) . In this environment, scientists explore alternative theories, conflicting evidence and various social projects, such as alternative fuels, genetic engineering and the education of children. However, the availability of a discursive medium constituted through a common language and ontology is not sufficient for objectivity. The progress of the discourse depends on critical engagement and hence on scientists sharing with each other any dissenting opinions and conflicting observations. This expectation of disclosure in science is evident from the scandals about scientists keeping secrets and failing to disclose their findings, including the long history of the tobacco industry. There are also more isolated instances, like the 1996 Nancy Olivieri case in Toronto, in which drug manufacturer Apotex suppressed research findings made by Dr Olivieri at the Toronto Hospital for Sick Children (CBC News 2001), and their continued efforts to keep her from discussing the drug (CAUT Bulletin 2009). Often, scandals about silence in science depend on moral concerns, such as about whose health decisions might be ill-served because of such incomplete research. Yet, there are also epistemic problems with silence in science, regarding both the basic function of science to provide education and access to the truth, and its dependence on critical dialogue to provide the objective understanding that Longino describes.
Scandals stem from violations of rhetorical assumptions about the significance of silence, notably that silence should indicate only the irrelevance of or unimportance of an observation, theory or evaluation. Indeed, a background of silence regarding some matters is part of the environment that provides focus for the critical discussion.
PROTOCOLS OF SILENCE AND DISCLOSURE
Contextual objectivity depends on criticism fostered by scientific protocols that demand ongoing disclosure of findings and uptake of others' results. Yet, the demands for disclosure are limited, and individual scientists choose to remain silent and impose silence for various reasons, especially because they judge a particular observation, finding or interpretation to be irrelevant. Whereas in personal relationships the appropriateness of disclosure is constantly open to negotiation, in science silence becomes institutionalized, regularly denoting judgments of epistemological irrelevance.
Silence about certain matters demarcates scientific discourse. Scientists never reveal everything that they know or believe, and much personal baggage and belief is left at the laboratory door. To note the separation of science from the rest of the community is not, however, to support the outdated view that science is distinguished from non-science by reasoning that involves no background assumptions (Longino 1990: 45) . Clearly, all people have beliefs that orient their scientific work, but some people have beliefs that directly conflict with that work. Witness creationists who work in biology where they make regular use of the theory of evolution by natural selection. Also, beliefs that do not directly conflict with scientific assumptions are kept silent: personal views and thoughts -regarding one's children's progress in school, or a bad haircut -are put out of one's mind and kept out of conversation. 2 Sharing beliefs or experiences that are not pertinent to the task at hand would be problematic in many ways. After all, in no context ought people to express every passing thought.
The boundaries within which scientists expect disclosure from each other are fairly rigid, or at least regular. Laboratory operations, conference procedures, publication demands and legal restrictions on intellectual property establish requirements for silence and disclosure. This can take at least two of the forms of silence identified by Rae Langton (1993) , as illustrated in the following examples. First, editors decide who gets to publish, what gets published and what does not, a straightforward locutionary silencing that must occur in some form to maintain standards for communication. Second, laboratory heads give praise, resources or other encouragement to some people rather than to others, thus effectively silencing the others in a perlocutionary manner. 3 These forms of silencing escape notice because they are part of regular scientific procedures. Similar regularity defines general academic discourse and other institutionalized forms of inquiry. For instance, the audience in an academic presentation must remain silent unless and until the chair of the session invites questions and comments. In legal environments and businesses, likewise, specific laws and contracts govern what is disclosed and what kept silent. These are chosen rather than imposed silences, and indicate respect and sometimes agreement, rather than mere deference.
What warrants disclosure in a particular discourse depends ultimately on decisions made by people -in science, by the referees, editors, publishers and administrators of various sorts. They consider convention as well as perceived interest from scientists themselves, who also aim to follow the standards that the others set; so the evaluations have coherence, a potentially virtuous circularity. Epistemological values such as simplicity, precision, theoretical fruitfulness 4 and objectivity itself, as well as market and technological potential, inform both traditional and particular subjective perceptions of relevance. 5 Social coherence extends diachronically too, because both conventional and personal evaluations take guidance from past practice in deciding what deserves utterance.
By contrast, expectations regarding disclosure are not so clear outside of institutions, in personal relationships, where the reasons for sharing beliefs and the extent to which they are shared varies indefinitely, and can be negotiated and renegotiated. The range of disclosure can be extensive in family and friendship; we expect the truth from each other in many contexts. However, the type of disclosure is negotiable, and requests for disclosure test existing social relationships, sometimes stretch and even disrupt them. To request that another person share his or her experience or opinion is to request a confirmation or perhaps a reconfiguring of the characteristics of the relationship, to clarify or set new bounds for existing expectations of silence and sharing. If I ask that you to tell me about your date last week, it may be just a prompt, noting that I expect that sort of disclosure in our friendship; or it can be a request for a new form of intimacy between us, a change in our relationship, especially if I press the matter.
Regularity distinguishes the bounds of disclosure in science because, from schools and intellectual societies to businesses, science operates as an institution, a formal social environment. Science also collaborates with other institutions, such as cities, countries and not-specifically scientific businesses in which people have different but equally regular and regulated expectations of disclosure from each other. Our participation in these formal communities entails that they may demand to learn things from us, for example, in the form of subpoenas, status reports and job descriptions. Such protocols hold for any and all communities and organizations that pursue inquiry and develop knowledge, though perhaps especially in legal environments. Indeed, the epistemic functioning of a group, its ability to generate knowledge, may depend on its scientific status. The objectivity of any community requires quasi-scientific protocols of disclosure, instituted for instance through laws, collective agreements and contracts. The choice to disclose is not negotiable on an ongoing basis, in contrast to personal and informal relationships where the choice may be ad hoc. Explicit communication marks the potential for the aperspectival objectivity valued by communities that operate as epistemic agents.
Despite the commonality that science has with other institutions that develop aperspectival objectivity, and given that all institutions must to some extent develop knowledge, the expectation that scientists will disclose specific findings, theories, hypotheses and conclusions does hold to the same extent in other institutions. Scientific reports demand engagement in the sense that uptake marks scientific status and success, whereas legal testimony and business reports frequently receive a silence of authoritative acceptance or simple respect. When a scientific report receives neither challenges nor citation people accord it no significance.
Silence, both from scientific investigators and sometimes from their subjects, covers whatever those individuals deem to be irrelevant to the goal of objectivity, according to the standards upheld by that particular (disciplinary, subdisciplinary or laboratory) community. So, the expectation of disclosure regarding whatever is deemed relevant and the provision of corresponding uptake (also a form of disclosure) limit the recognized functions of silences and thus minimize the ambiguity and vagueness it brings. Outside of institutions, no clear protocols determine which observations and insights are relevant to disclose. Common etiquette is more flexible than the sorts of regulation that guide scientific discourse. Generally in relationships among people and communities that are not centrally concerned with the development of objectivity, disclosure depends on a perceived 'need to know'. Various positive motivations, from encouraging intimacy to expressing cooperation, encourage the sharing of understanding, by contrast to withholding information that might be valuable to others when competing with them or wishing them not to succeed. Admittedly, competition among scientists also encourages premature publication and falsification of data, which undermines the quality of scientific discourse, but such behaviour is exceptional. The generally characteristic lack of competition among scientists, in view of their shared project of creating knowledge and specific shared investigations, grounds the scientific mandate to require disclosure, and provides a specifically limited context for interpreting silence.
The appropriateness and meaningfulness of disclosure depends substantially on the particular social environment, and how institutionalized it is. The more institutionalized are the practices regarding silence and disclosure, the more clear and the less negotiable they are. So, as well as science having an epistemic and specifically empirical focus, disclosure distinguishes scientific communities among others to the extent that protocols define which sorts of information its members exchange. These protocols of disclosure make sharing information an obligation and having it requested a distinguishing honour.
THE POWER OF SILENCE AND SILENCING
Expressing one's own view may or may not be valued or required outside of institutions that seek objectivity. For instance, inside and outside science such explicit goals as justice, prudence or politics may be as important as objectivity. Intentions of all sorts can be conveyed without verbal expression. Silence can be a way of expressing respect or deference, in addition to how it can express a passive regard that includes agreement. It can also indicate disagreement or denial, but in any case both the attitude and the object of the attitude -what is agreed on or resisted -tends to be ambiguous. Even clear indications of irrelevance signified by silence are complicated matters, each with a wide range of possible implications. For these reasons, being silent or imposing silence can serve various strategic purposes, as Cheryl Glenn (2004: 4-5) argues in Unspoken: A Rhetoric of Silence: 'Silence can deploy power; it can defer to power. It all depends . . . In our talkative Western culture . . . speech is synonymous with civilization itself and . . . silence-as-obedience is frequently rewarded' (Glenn 2004: xi, xii) . Thus, I suggest that our western science may benefit from considering the ways that silence may not mean acceptance or even the passivity that comes to pass as acceptance. Perhaps, silence may be a strategy that resists current scientific practices and, understanding such resistance would serve objectivity by contributing to the critical discourse.
In all contexts, silence interrupts discourse and thus control over silence depends on and provides power, affecting not only who can be silent and who must be silent, but also what their silences mean. In order for keeping silence to be meaningful in some form, it is presumed that speech is crucial, and those who already have power can refuse to grant meaningfulness to a silence. In any culture, those in power retain the right to decide who speaks, and who is silent. So, silence can be a form of oppression (Glenn 2004) because it can restrict one group of people in the service of another (Frye 1983) .
Science institutionalizes the norms of conversation, and conversation implies equality: no interruptions, taking turns and no silence (Glenn 2004) . By contrast, positions of power, such as in science, provide monopolies over the floor and the topics, and also provide the prerogative to remain silent at will. For instance, contemporary science ignores eugenics for moral reasons, but capitalist science also ignores cries for socially equitable technologies. The power science has to ignore these issues and judge them to be irrelevant shows how it controls the significance of silence.
Using silence effectively depends on power; whether one chooses one's own silence or imposes it on another. The legal right of individuals to remain silent is important because silence provides power, or the ability to resist power. Glenn argues that the power of silence is demonstrated by the ways that former US President Bill Clinton demanded the right to be silent about his marital infidelities, and in turn his wife received the authority to defend him. On the other hand, silence can be imposed: judges can require silence; and although women may speak more often than men, women are more frequently interrupted (Glenn 2004: 21-43) . Consider how Monica Lewinsky was legally silenced, and Clinton's other partners were criticized for coming forward (Glenn 2004: 77-106) . Further, consider Anita Hill's compelled testimony for the US Senate Judiciary Committee about sexual harassment by her supervisor Clarence Thomas. 6 Her choice to be silent for ten years was treated as evidence of her dishonesty, although the type of public humiliation and threatened loss of employment she subsequently endured obviously discourages anyone from disclosing sexual harassment (Glenn 2004: 52-76) . In addition to Glenn's publicly political examples, feminists have argued that many private activities, such as the production and consumption of pornography, are political because they silence women (Langton 1993) . This silence may be a form of oppression, but it could also be a form of resistance: its significance depends on how people with power interpret it. We can only effectively employ silence to the extent that we already have degrees of power. Therefore, gender, race and class affect the ability to retreat into silence or impose it. Retreating to protect oneself from attack of various kinds is possible, even though silence does not always provide or signal safety, and although others may impose silence as a means of control. Silence can also be a symptom of oppression: because and insofar as it is a sign that people feel vulnerable; but it can also be part of the protocol of oppression, a way of making a group of people vulnerable (Glenn 2004: 43-8) .
The multiple ambiguities of silence affect how people from European cultures, for instance, tend to view non-European peoples such as those of First Nations. The 'noble, silent Indian' is a familiar figure. This image is not completely a false stereotype, for Native American cultures do not embrace the 'Greek rhetorical tradition of public, political display' and western writing practices based on dialectic, argument and debate (Glenn 2004: 113) . So, silences from First Nations people seem strange and prominent to those of us immersed in culture derived from the European enlightenment. Consider how European cultures employ titles, such as 'sir' and 'ma'am', to demonstrate respect, whereas many natives of the American Southwest use silence and teach silence to children as a way to communicate the same respect. That in these native cultures silence can also indicate an indifference that is familiar to Europeans (Glenn 2004: 148-9) only multiplies the ambiguities of silence.
Failure to share one's opinion or perspective may mean things quite different from what scientific discourse assumes: instead of agreement or disinterest, it may indicate respect; or it may indicate submission and oppression. Politeness or deference, and even fear, can mask dissent. Silence does not always indicate passive agreement or lack of understanding, even in a heavily structured context that demands disclosure.
THE AWKWARDNESS IN A CONTEXT/CULTURE OF DISCLOSURE
Dissenters may feel threatened, especially if the dissent in any way resonates with their membership in a social minority -as women may dissent from sexism, and they may retreat into the relative safety of silence (Glenn 2004) . Further, many scientists at home in the culture of disclosure, including as a result of their successful scientific training, will have difficulty understanding and recognizing the ambiguities surrounding silence from the social margins because of the authority of the scientific interpretation. This problem is exacerbated if their scientific training dovetails with their own European background. These arguments about scientists apply to other people in quasiscientific communities and within the larger public context to the extent that they engage in a culture of disclosure. We are thwarted in achieving aperspectival objective beliefs by the uniformity of our training, and our own authority, and by the psychology of communal practice. Regardless of individual backgrounds, and whether objectivity is their goal, members of any group tend to conform in belief, a general phenomenon that is increased by scientific acceptance of that belief. The implication of the testing of a theory depends on the existing alternative theories, and the uniformity of scientists' views impedes the development of alternatives and of the potential for aperspectival objectivity. This regressive tendency can, however, be counteracted by attention to the rhetorical significance of silence.
The assumption that scientists have common personal backgrounds is warranted to the extent that they share similar training; so, ignoring that assumption is efficient and streamlines discourse. Yet it also prevents interrogation of the assumption, which could enable us to recognize the effect of personal backgrounds and histories. Ignoring scientists' backgrounds and personal subjectivities encourages false assumptions, and discourages consideration of the variety of ways in which people -including scientists -can and do engage the world.
It can be very difficult to scrutinize or even recognize assumptions in mainstream science. Cognitive psychology reveals that people seek out like-minded views and avoid dissenting views, a tendency known as the 'confirmation bias'. In addition, when people in a group share the same biases, they are likely to reinforce each other's bias (Kornblith 2005) . On top of these overdeterminations of background assumptions common to all shared views, scientific practice reinforces shared biases, as Kathleen Okruhlik (1995) argues, because thorough testing of scientific theories only entrenches sociopolitical assumptions if that testing is never against theories supported by contrasting beliefs. So, if only men in patriarchal cultures develop scientific theories, the result will be sexist science. Even if the culture is more diverse, as it certainly is, the confirmation bias entails that dissenting views are rarely considered. The result is that science tends to preserve existing dominant background views. Although non-sexist views may be available in a scientific culture with a patriarchal heritage, they are unlikely to receive serious consideration and likely to be silent or silenced.
How do we counteract the regressive invisibility of background assumptions and how these assumptions draw on and contribute to misunderstandings of silence? Interaction between scientific and other communities (i.e. ethnic cultures and genders) can provide valuable diversity in understanding and challenging assumptions to counteract the confirmation bias. Western scientists have fairly uniform training complete with the European rhetorical heritage. These people deal not only with each other, however; they also deal with research ethicists, lawyers and plumbers, all of whom may be better able than scientists to critique background assumptions because they are less vulnerable to the homogenizing social dynamics of cognition and scientific practice. These other people and these other dimensions of individual scientists can contribute to the critical discourse, and allow us to evaluate the extent and importance of objectivity. Sometimes the most distant perspective may provide the most useful criticism. For instance, few people are willing to challenge the taboo against scientific explorations of eugenics. Yet this silence hides the eugenic implications of the scientific money and effort currently flowing into reproductive technologies. Such science serves the wealthy, Whites, westerners, the able-bodied and males (though not exclusively heterosexuals), which is clear from a poor, dark-skinned, southern disabled women's perspective. Yet there is no way to simply adopt distant perspectives in order to understand the silences in our discourses. We need to interpret silence beforehand, in order to adopt the perspectives of people living in communities marginalized by science (Harding 1993: 69) .
Science's critical environment comes at a cost. Because silencing, or imposing silence, can be hurtful, a form of domination, regular protocols of silence are neither generally benign nor are they beneficial; they are likely to reinforce the oppressive aspects of science and quasi-scientific discourses. The power of science to control the perceived significance of silence is inflected with privileges of gender, race, class and along other axes of oppression. The international and cross-cultural prestige of science combined with its assumption of ongoing disclosure and uptake suggest that science has special impacts on and may help constitute the ways that silence contributes to oppression. Scientific research may: (1) misinterpret silence among scientists, or from subjects, or from the public as indicating agreement or disinterest -in science itself or in whatever issues are being studied; and may (2) impose silence by speaking for people, again both inside and outside of science, rather than letting them speak for themselves. Together, these imply that scientific enculturation inclines people to interpret imposed silence as agreement or disinterest. Therefore, scientific assumptions about the significance of silence are especially a problem regarding the silences of socially marginalized people, whose gender, race, class and so on make their needs and interests unfamiliar. The European culture of disclosure provides effective means for inquiry, and I do not mean to suggest that we need to change the central practices of science or the law. But we do need to think a bit more about the underlying values. What makes disclosure important is that it facilitates confrontation among competing beliefs, which twentieth-century philosophy tends to assume is the only effective means to advance understanding (Moulton 1983) .
Some individual scientists may not experience these forms of marginalization. Further, experiences scientists have themselves or observe in the oppressed lives of others may be discounted by their training in our scientific culture that views human interest in terms of the interests of affluent heterosexual western white men. Some of this is inevitable, but the social uniformity among scientists can be interrogated by considering the rhetoric of silence.
CONCLUSION: SILENCE AND THE LIMITS OF OBJECTIVITY
Using silence, adopting or demanding it to convey meaning, only succeeds if one already has the power to engage in the discourse. People's silence often has different significance than the agreement or disinterest that define it in discourses that seek objectivity. So it is important to consider the assumptions about disclosure in the context of scientific and quasi-scientific environments. The assumption behind the view that all parties disclose epistemologically significant understandings is that all interested parties agree to the discursive standards, or they would speak up. However, because of cultural background or oppression, or personal idiosyncrasies, people may remain silent about their dissent or agreement, or about further supporting information and challenges.
People may employ silence without being aware exactly what change they want, as a default method of opposition; in this way, it is much like passive resistance. The problem people might have with scientific discourse may be its exclusive focus on objectivity and its inattention to other goals. Interpreting these desires depends on the rhetorical skill of listening, which allows us to comprehend silences as well as disclosures (Glenn 2004; Ratcliffe 2005) . Part of the rhetorical consideration concerns to whom we listen. Is the silence from an authority? A lab director? A technician? A student? Or a subject? Forms of status and marginalization are particularly important in understanding silence. We must also consider differences in power beyond the formal scientific relationships, such as those that follow axes of oppression. Because silence can be a form of domination, it is only effective resistance when, to the contrary, speech is expected, or demanded, and received with sensitivity to its various meanings. So it is only effective if one already has a 'voice'.
Objectivity is neither a comprehensive value nor of singular importance. To begin with, science may serve non-cognitive goals, such as moral and political values, and perhaps even aesthetic values. Also, in contrast with objectivity, other forms of epistemological value are less institutionalized and more flexible: practical knowledge, intuition, emotional understanding and so on. Some of these may be pursued through non-discursive practices, such as apprenticeship, and through discourses that take more time than the critical discourse that fuels objectivity. Objectivity depends on quick exchanges of information: however, not all understandings that we want are of the sort that can be quickly shared and captured through the culture of disclosure.
Rather than indicating merely a need to change the style of discussion, silence can be a request for another general form of engagement, or a rejection of the current form. What form of engagement or understanding is at issue is not even clear: the whole of western science or its most particular practices. Indeed, silence might express rejection of the norm of disclosure itself or of the pursuit of objectivity. These are the sorts of multiple ambiguities silence has in the context of science and other discourses that seek objectivity.
Critical discourse may well produce cognitive value in exactly the way Longino describes. But perhaps that objectivity is not all we need from science. Among the values we need is representation. Longino's (1993) model tries to secure that by stressing the need for diversity in the scientific community. But it remains to be explained how we can achieve appropriately diverse engagement and disclosure, since protocols of disclosure may conflict with other forms of meaningful interaction and may even obscure available sources of criticism.
A popular feminist alternative to Longino's contextual objectivity is Sandra Harding's (1993) 'strong objectivity', which is similarly achievable by degrees, but by contrast achieved by reflexive individuals rather than by communities. However, 'strong objectivity' does not answer the problem of accounting for silence. Whether we prefer Harding's or Longino's account depends as much on whether we want an individual or social account as on anything else. We need some feminist account of how scientific knowledge manifests at the community level, how 'we know'. 7 However, even if the individual person is the level of our concern, the prescriptions of strong objectivity are vague (Longino 1993: 211) . It is not clear exactly how scientists are to consider themselves on the same plane of discussion as their subject matter, as strong objectivity requires. Further, I suggest, this reflexivity depends on expectations about disclosure. Articulating one's own situation demands disclosure of one's self-perception, but expecting disclosure from marginalized subjects will certainly put them at a disadvantage in a power matrix that marginalizes them. Thinking from marginalized perspectives must involve an appreciation for the significance and ambivalences behind the other's silences, which neither account of objectivity provides. Perhaps the reflective thinking of strong objectivity is meant to provide rhetorical listening that would account for meaningful silence, but that remains to be demonstrated. As it stands, rhetorical listening seems to be the more basic requirement because it addresses silence.
There are many forms of silence that affect science. The silences of scientists themselves, of subjects, and from the general public who constitute the audience for science, all have distinct significances for scientific objectivity at both the social and individual level. The flexibility of silent meanings outside of science suggests that silence must also have multiple rhetorical functions in science, in addition to enforcing standards of relevance. Critical focus on how scientists assess the relevance of pieces of information and particular understandings results from attention to the many significances that silence can have. The meanings of silence may be beyond what objectivity can address, and yet also hold understanding that can enhance objectivity.
Catherine Hundleby University of Windsor, Canada
Notes 1 Longino (1990) argues the community must provide the four criteria for critical discourse: (1) avenues for the expression and diffusion of criticism;
(2) uptake of, and response to, criticism; (3) public standards by reference to which theories, etc. are assessed; and (4) equality of intellectual authority. 2 When we cannot set these aside we end up with a 'bifurcated consciousness', which Dorothy Smith (1987) argues is particularly valuable in women. 3 Illocutionary silence occurs when the presence of marginalized people, such as women, in science is used as reason to consider that such people are adequately represented by science in the sense that science serves their interests. However, this is a more flexible form of silence than that which typifies institutions. 4 Thomas Kuhn (1979) lists scientific values in this way. 5 Being assessed without a particular value does not entail that what is expressed actually lacks such significance. 6 Hill does not herself use the words 'sexual harassment', but what she describes isliterally -a textbook case. 7 Lynn Hankinson Nelson (1990) offers a social theory of evidence, but its normative application is unclear.
